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Abstract 
Following upon the Supreme Court of Appeal's judgment in 
Butters v Mncora 2012 4 SA 1 (SCA), which broadened the 
criteria and consequences of universal partnerships in 
cohabitation relationships, this article investigates the potential 
of universal partnerships and putative marriages to allocate 
rights to share in partnership property in other intimate 
relationships. It traverses several instances in which marriages 
are not recognised - bigamous marriages, Muslim and Hindu 
religious marriages and invalid customary marriages – 
examining whether the wives in these marriages could use 
universal partnerships and putative marriages to claim a share 
in property. It then considers the use of universal partnerships 
to obtain a share of property in civil marriages out of community 
of property. It concludes by pointing out several issues which 
are in need of clarification and where the common law should 
be developed to give effect to fundamental constitutional rights. 
Keywords 
Universal partnerships; customary marriage; putative marriage; 
Muslim marriage; Hindu marriage; bigamy; marriage out of 
community of property. 
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1  Introduction 
In a 2015 article1 I examined a series of cases culminating in Butters v 
Mncora,2 which progressively eroded the sui generis common law 
remedies for breach of promise, while simultaneously extending universal 
partnerships to cohabiting couples who were engaged to be married. In 
this way the courts awarded rights to share in partnership property3 to 
cohabitants. This is a significant development, since the common law did 
not extend rights to partnership property to engaged couples, but rather 
awarded contractual damages for both actual loss (or wasted expenses) 
and prospective loss (the loss of financial benefits expected from the 
future marriage) together with sentimental damages.4 The conditions 
under and the extent to which the common law remedies remain available 
are now in flux, but will doubtlessly be clarified in future cases. 
Nevertheless, this use of universal partnerships provides an avenue by 
which poorer partners – usually women - can share in the assets which 
were generated during an intimate relationship. 
Most significant for the achievement of gender equality in asset distribution 
are, firstly, the Supreme Court of Appeal's explicit pronouncement that a 
universal partnership between intimate partners can be concluded either 
expressly or tacitly – by way of conduct - and that it can exist while 
partners are also engaged or married.5 Second, the majority in Butters 
held that partnership assets could also encompass non-financial benefits 
and that those non-financial contributions, like child-care and 
homemaking, which women typically make, should also be taken into 
account in determining the existence and extent of a universal 
partnership.6 Indeed, Brand JA expressly mentioned the "greater 
awareness in modern society of the value of the contribution of those who 
are prepared to sacrifice the satisfaction of pursuing their own careers, in 
the best interests of their families".7 
                                            
* Elsje Bonthuys. BA, LLB, LLM (Stell). Ph.D. (Cantab). School of Law, University of 
the Witwatersrand. My thanks to Bradley Smith for his valuable advice on this piece 
and to Ebe Aguebor for research assistance. I am also grateful to Monja Posthumus-
Meyjes for drawing my attention to the Andrews judgment. Email: 
Elsje.Bonthuys@wits.ac.za. 
1  Bonthuys 2015 SALJ 76. 
2  Butters v Mncora 2012 4 SA 1 (SCA) (hereafter the Butters case). 
3  I use the term partnership property throughout this piece to refer to property which 
had been amassed during the intimate relationship or marriage. 
4  Bull v Taylor 1965 4 SA 29 (A). 
5  Ponelat v Schrepfer 2012 1 SA 206 (SCA) para 22 (hereafter the Ponelat case). 
6  Ponelat case paras 18-22.  
7  Ponelat case para 22. 
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While the cohabiting couples in these and subsequent cases8 were 
engaged to marry, there are now precedents for using universal 
partnerships to award assets to cohabitants who are not engaged.9 In 
Paixão v Road Accident Fund, which involved a contractual duty of 
support rather than a universal partnership, it was argued that the duty of 
support should be recognised only for cohabitation relationships in which 
the parties were engaged to be married, rather than extending it to all 
cohabitants. The court rejected this contention, holding that it would 
constitute an arbitrary and unjustified limitation on the duty of support. 
Rather than focussing on whether or not the parties had been engaged, 
the enquiry should be whether the parties had established a legal duty of 
support in "a relationship akin to marriage".10 The same reasoning should 
apply to distinguishing between universal partnerships where parties are 
engaged and those in which they are not engaged. I therefore do not 
propose to deal with cohabitation relationships in any further depth. 
Instead, this article continues where the previous one ended by exploring 
the potential use of universal partnerships to redistribute property in other 
relationship forms.11 Because some cases use putative marriages and 
universal partnerships interchangeably, and because putative marriages 
may exist in certain cases where universal partnerships can be claimed, I 
consider both. I am particularly interested in ameliorating the financial 
disadvantage suffered by women as a result of the rigid legal distinctions 
between marriage, on the one hand, and relationships which do not qualify 
as marriage, on the other hand. Flowing from these distinctions is a 
system of rules which privilege the married above the unmarried, including 
those whose marriages are regarded as defective through no fault of their 
own.12 To clarify this somewhat bewildering array of relationships I have 
divided the discussion into three categories: first, I refer to "the 
inadequately married" to describe women in invalid marriages, including 
Hindu and Muslim religious marriages and customary marriages which 
don't comply with customary requirements; second, women in bigamous 
marriages and coterminous customary and civil marriages, which I call 
"the simultaneously married"; and finally women in civil marriages which 
                                            
8  Paixão v Road Accident Fund 2012 6 SA 377 (SCA) (hereafter the Paixão case); 
Cloete v Maritz 2014 JOL 32110 (WCC) (hereafter the Cloete case). 
9  This was argued but not established by the evidence in McDonald v Young 2012 3 
SA 1 (SCA) (hereafter the McDonald case) and Steyn v Hasse 2015 4 SA 405 
(WCC). 
10  Paixão case paras 38-39. 
11  Smith "Dissolution of a Life or Domestic Partnership" 389, 436-442. 
12  For a critique of this, see Bonthuys Patchwork of Marriages. 
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exclude both community of property and the accrual system, but who do 
not qualify for redistribution orders – "the unwisely married". 
The discursive connection, both in law and popular culture, between 
marriage and partnership has long been established. On the one hand, 
Henning13 traces the legal institution of partnership to family agreements 
to cooperate for the common good in ancient times. The societas 
universorum bonorum, in particular, has been linked with cooperation 
between family members, specifically relationships between spouses in 
marriages without ante-nuptial contracts, where the joint estate has 
frequently (albeit technically inaccurately) been described as a universal 
partnership.14 Hahlo,15 for instance, refers to the marriage in community of 
property as "a universal economic partnership". The terms "life 
partnership" and "civil partnership" in the Civil Union Act16 also express the 
close association of marriage with the idea of a partnership encompassing 
the material, social and affective aspects of life. 
We can therefore argue that there is a strong conceptual link between 
family life and partnerships, specifically the two forms of universal 
partnerships which form the subject matter of this article. Universal 
partnerships are distinguished from partnerships which relate to particular 
assets only and comprise two forms. The societas universorum bonorum – 
which encompasses both existing and future property - can, according to 
the Butters case, include both financial and non-financial goods and 
contributions – while the societas quae ex quaestu veniunt includes all 
property and profits that have been acquired during the subsistence of the 
partnership.17 The latter tends to be associated with particular business 
enterprises and would presumably exclude non-financial contributions and 
gains. 
Both forms of universal partnerships have historically been used to 
supplement the common law in certain established areas – where there 
was a defective marriage ceremony, as a mechanism to distribute property 
equally between spouses in putative marriages, and to provide some 
property sharing in Hindu and Muslim religious marriages. There are also 
cases which deal with bigamous marriages and marriages out of 
                                            
13  Henning and Snyman-Van Deventer "Partnership" para 253. 
14  Henning and Snyman-Van Deventer "Partnership" paras 257, 44-48; Erasmus et al 
Family, Things and Succession para 80. Ex parte L (also known as A) 1947 3 SA 50 
(C) 59 (hereafter the Ex parte L case), referring to Voet (23.2.68/69) and Grotius 
(3.21.10). 
15  Hahlo South African Law of Husband and Wife 157. 
16  Section 1 of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006. 
17  Henning and Snyman-Van Deventer "Partnership" para 256. 
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community of property. Those cases which grant rights to share in 
property use Pothier's well-known requirements for the establishment of a 
legal partnership, formulated as follows in Butters:18 
firstly, that each of the parties brings something into the partnership or binds 
themselves to bring something into it, whether it be money, or labour, or skill. 
The second element is that the partnership business should be carried on for 
the joint benefit of both parties. The third is that the object should be to make 
a profit. A fourth element proposed by Pothier, namely, that the partnership 
contract should be legitimate, has been discounted by our courts for being 
common to all contracts. 
For the purposes of this article Pothier's fourth requirement, which we 
could term legality or lawfulness, is particularly relevant in certain 
situations. 
In the Butters case the Supreme Court of Appeal held that, given the 
general acceptance of Pothier's criteria and their application to intimate 
relationships, it was unnecessary to add Felicius-Boxelius' three additional 
requirements of cohabitation, freedom of accounting and sharing of 
profits.19  
2  Universal partnerships and putative marriages for the 
inadequately married 
In this section I will consider the use of universal partnerships and putative 
marriages, to award property rights to women whose marriages are not 
recognised, either because of substantive or procedural defects, or 
because the marriages have historically not received full legal recognition, 
like Hindu and Muslim marriages. I will also consider invalid customary 
marriages, which represent an area of significant legal neglect. 
Cases decided before the advent of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 often 
dealt with marriages conducted by religious officials who had not been 
properly appointed as marriage officers. The first reported South African 
case which uses the universal partnership to redistribute property in family 
law is Moghrabi,20 where the marriage ceremony, conducted by a rabbi, 
was invalid. The court held that, since the parties intended to be married in 
community of property, there had been a universal partnership, to which 
both contributed equally. The wife was therefore entitled to half of the 
combined assets. In a similar situation, the court in Ex parte L (also known 
as A)21 held that a wife in a putative marriage had the right to half of the 
                                            
18  Butters case para 11. 
19  Butters case paras 16-17. 
20  Moghrabi 1921 AD 274. 
21  Ex parte L case 60. 
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deceased husband's estate upon his death. Although the court relied upon 
the decision in Moghrabi, the many references to putative marriages22 
indicate that these early decisions did not draw rigid distinctions between 
universal partnerships and putative marriages.23 Instead, it seems that the 
universal partnership was regarded as an appropriate legal vehicle to 
award half a share of the partnership property to the bona fide (usually 
female) spouse in a putative marriage. In some situations, therefore, it 
appears that wives could rely either on universal partnerships or putative 
marriages to establish a right to share in partnership property.  
Technically the consequences of putative marriages should, however, be 
different from those for universal partnerships. For instance, Sinclair and 
Heaton describe the proprietary consequences of putative marriages as 
follows:24 
If both parties were bona fide and they did not enter into an antenuptial 
contract, it must be assumed that they intended to be married in community 
of property, and they must be treated accordingly. If only one of the parties 
was bona fide, community takes place if this is to the advantage of the 
innocent party, but not otherwise. 
This would mean that in a putative marriage the legal relief would be 
tailored to suit the financial interests of the innocent party. If the innocent 
party would benefit from community of property, she would simply be 
entitled to half of the partnership property instead of having a court assess 
the extent of her contribution in order to determine her share, as in the 
case of a universal partnership.25 The requirements for putative marriages 
are also different from those for universal partnerships,26 with no need to 
prove Pothier's three elements.27 Because of these differences, using 
universal partnerships as vehicles to award assets in putative marriages 
may not be the best solution in every case. It may therefore be strategic to 
consider whether to formulate claims for partnership property as universal 
partnerships or putative marriages. This distinction, although not made in 
                                            
22  Ex parte L case 58, 59, 60. 
23  Also see Annabhay v Ramlall 1960 3 SA 802 (D) (hereafter the Annabhay case) 
805E-F to the effect that "It would appear, therefore, that save in the case of a lawful 
marriage or a putative marriage, a partnership universorum bonorum, in so far as it 
may still be recognised by our law, can only be entered into expressly". This 
statement (although substantially incorrect) illustrates the way in which courts tended 
to treat putative marriages and universal partnerships as interchangeable or 
equivalent. Also see Moola v Aulsebrook 1983 1 All SA 278 (N) 280 (hereafter the 
Moola case); Sepheri v Scanlan 2008 1 SA 322 (C) 338C-D. 
24  Sinclair and Heaton Law of Marriage 408. This is based on Hahlo South African Law 
of Husband and Wife 115 which, in turn, relies on Roman-Dutch sources. Also see 
Smith 2011 SALJ 560, 568. 
25  See for instance Ponelat case 206; Cloete case 32110. 
26  See Clark Family Law Service A63, A64. 
27  See M v M 1962 2 SA 114 (GW). 
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the older cases, is supported by the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Ramatshimbila v Phaswana28 in which an exception was lodged against a 
simultaneous claim for both a putative marriage and a universal 
partnership. Zondi JA held that:29 
The difficulty with the plaintiff's main claim is that it contains two causes of 
action which are mutually inconsistent as the legal consequences flowing 
from a putative marriage and universal partnership are different. They cannot 
be rolled up into a single claim … 
Hindu and Muslim religious marriages do not qualify as putative marriages 
when the spouses do not have a bona fide belief that they have conducted 
a valid civil marriage.30 Unable therefore to rely on the mechanism of 
putative marriage to obtain a share of their husbands' property, wives in 
these marriages have sought to establish the existence of universal 
partnerships instead. 
In some respects the 1949 judgment in Isaacs v Isaacs31 anticipates the 
Butters decision. The parties had been in a Muslim religious marriage for 
28 years. Together they founded and operated several businesses in 
which the wife took an active part, in addition to caring for the home, her 
husband and their ten children. The court held that she had proven the 
existence of a tacit universal partnership, the purpose of which was "to 
provide the necessaries of life and such a measure of comfort and security 
as could be obtained for the common welfare in the home and the 
upbringing and education of their children".32 To the husband's argument 
that the wife's domestic duties precluded her from making a substantial 
business contribution, the court replied that it could never have been their 
intention that the profits of their ventures should accrue to the man only33 
and that, because the joint venture included provision for the family's 
wellbeing, the wife's household work formed part of her contribution to the 
partnership.34 The use of a universal partnership to bring about common 
benefit beyond purely commercial ventures was subsequently confirmed in 
another Muslim marriage in the case of Ally v Dinath.35  
                                            
28  Ramatshimbila v Phaswana 2014 ZASCA 117 (19 September 2014) (hereafter the 
Ramatshimbila case). 
29  Ramatshimbila case para 8. 
30  Isaacs v Isaacs 1949 1 SA 952 (C) 958 (hereafter the Isaacs case); Solomon v 
Abrams 1991 4 SA 437 (W); Ngubane v Ngubane 1983 2 SA 770 (T) (hereafter the 
Ngubane case). Putative marriages have, however, been held to exist when the 
parties were bona fide, as in the Moola case 687. 
31  Isaacs case 952. 
32  Isaacs case 961. 
33  Isaacs case 961. 
34  Isaacs case 962. 
35  Ally v Dinath 1984 2 SA 451 (T) 455A-C. 
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Ratanee v Maharaj36 concerned a Hindu marriage between an illiterate 
fourteen-year-old girl and an older, educated man. After 20 years, during 
which the wife took care of the household and eight children, while also 
assisting in the husband's shop, the marriage was formally registered, 
together with an antenuptial contract excluding community of property. 
After the husband's death, all the property was appropriated by his 
brother, leaving the wife in penury. The main issue was whether the wife 
had signed the antenuptial contract as a result of her husband's undue 
influence,37 but the court also held that, if a universal partnership "the 
object of which was to provide for the household" had been established 
before registration of the marriage, the wife would not have forfeited her 
rights to a share of the partnership property by entering into a binding 
antenuptial contract at a later stage.38 This case therefore repeated the 
idea in Isaacs that the aim of the universal partnership could have been 
the maintenance of the family unit rather than a business venture. Also 
important is the fact that the wife, who only occasionally assisted in her 
husband's business, could establish a universal partnership. The Butters 
decision that the object of the universal partnership could be both financial 
gain and the maintenance of family members, and that wives' non 
business-related contributions must be taken into account, therefore did 
not come out of the blue, but is presaged by the decisions in these cases. 
Another vehicle for awarding property rights in Muslim marriages is the 
enforcement of premarital contracts. In Ismail v Ismail39 the Appellate 
Division held that it would be contra bonos mores to enforce a premarital 
contract which would countenance a potentially polygynous marriage. 
Subsequently, in Ryland v Edros40 the Cape Provincial Division held that 
the enforcement of marriage contracts in de facto monogamous Islamic 
marriages could no longer be regarded as contra bonos mores in the light 
of the non-discrimination clauses in the Bill of Rights.41 In this particular 
case the contract provided simply that the marriage would be governed by 
Islamic law. Although the expert witnesses agreed that wives have rights 
to be maintained for the whole duration of their marriages, in this case the 
wife was prevented by prescription from claiming the full sum of the 
spousal maintenance which had accrued during the marriage.42 The court 
                                            
36  Ratanee v Maharaj 1950 2 SA 538 (D) (hereafter the Ratanee case). 
37  Ratanee case 547-552. 
38  Ratanee case 546. 
39  Ismail v Ismail 1983 1 SA 1006 (A). 
40  Ryland v Edros 1997 2 SA 690 (C) (hereafter the Ryland case). Also see Moosa 
"Dissolution of a Muslim Marriage" 282, 334-335. 
41  Ryland case 709C-D, 711B-D. 
42  Ryland case 713H-I. 
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also found that she had failed to establish the existence of a clear and 
undisputed Islamic custom which would allow her an equitable share of 
her husband's property on the basis of her contribution to the marriage.43 
She was, however, entitled to a gift to console her for her husband's 
unjustified termination of the marriage. Depending on its terms, therefore, 
enforcing the marriage contract would not necessarily provide a wife with 
rights to share in property accumulated during the marriage. 
The wider question which this case raises, however, is whether the 
existence of an Islamic marriage contract would preclude a Muslim wife 
from relying on a universal partnership. It could be argued that the express 
marriage contract, with its implication of separate spousal estates, would 
render the conclusion of a tacit universal partnership agreement unlikely. 
On the other hand, this issue has not been raised in the numerous cases 
involving Muslim marriages and universal partnerships. Moreover, the 
jurisprudence holding that a universal partnership quae ex quaestu veniunt 
can co-exist with an antenuptial contract excluding community of property, 
as discussed below,44 could also apply to Muslim marriages.  
One result of the provision, in the Recognition of Customary Marriages 
Act, that a valid customary marriage "must be negotiated and entered into 
or celebrated in accordance with customary law"45 has been an ever-
increasing number of challenges to the validity of customary marriages on 
the basis that they do not comply with customary requirements relating to 
the handing over of brides, payment of lobolo and so forth.46 The obvious 
point is that in each customary marriage which is declared invalid, a 
woman who had throughout the relationship considered herself a wife 
loses her rights to share in partnership property if the marriage was in 
community of property, or her right to an equitable redistribution of marital 
property where the marriage was out of community of property.47 
Mwambene and Kruuse's critique of the detrimental effects of this 
increasingly "formal or definitional approach to customary marriages" upon 
customary wives is apt indeed.48 They also highlight the research which 
documents how officials from the Department of Home Affairs sometimes 
refuse to register customary marriages without valid grounds, which 
                                            
43  Ryland case 718G-H. 
44  See the discussion in para 4 below.  
45  Section 3(1)(b) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
46  See for instance Mabuza v Mbatha 2003 4 SA 218 (C); Ndlovu v Mokoena 2009 5 
SA 400 (GNP); Motsoatsoa v Roro 2011 2 All SA 324 (GSJ). Also see for a general 
discussion of this problem Kovacs, Ndashe and Williams 2013 Acta Juridica 273. 
47  Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 3 SA 152 (CC) (hereafter 
the Gumede case). 
48  Mwambene and Kruuse 2013 Acta Juridica 292. 
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makes it more difficult and sometimes impossible for wives to prove the 
existence of their marriages and gives opportunities to men and their 
families to confiscate matrimonial property to which wives should have 
been entitled.49 This is in addition to the numbers of customary wives 
whose marriages are invalid because they co-exist with civil marriages, as 
discussed below.50  
Mwambene and Kruuse suggest that wives in these invalid customary 
marriages should be afforded legal relief by regarding their relationships 
as putative marriages.51 This would enable them to claim for half of the 
partnership property, if they can prove that they were bona fide. As far as I 
have been able to ascertain, the common law concept of putative marriage 
has not yet been applied to customary marriages52 and I agree that it 
should be developed to apply to these marriages.53 Another potential 
solution would be to argue that the spouses in invalid customary 
marriages had established universal partnerships entitling wives to share 
in the partnership property. The wider definitions of partnership property 
and contributions set out in Butters would assist customary wives to make 
the argument and would go some way towards protecting them from the 
negative results of an invalid marriage. The co-existence of putative 
marriages or universal partnerships with other valid marriages in 
                                            
49  Mwambene and Kruuse 2013 Acta Juridica 293. Also see De Souza 2013 Acta 
Juridica 239; Kovacs, Ndashe and Williams 2013 Acta Juricdica 278-282. 
50  Para 3 below. 
51  Mwambene and Kruuse 2013 Acta Juridica 314-316. Also see Janse van Rensburg 
2003 TSAR 585, who makes the same suggestion at 588-589 to solve the problem 
of invalid customary marriages where the male partner had died. Monareng and 
Zoumenou 2007 Agenda 122, 128 suggest that this should be brought about by 
statutory amendment. The Ramatshimbila case, by not specifically indicating that a 
claim for a putative customary marriage would be excipiable, could be said to 
support the view that this may be possible. However, that may read too much into 
the case. 
52  In both the Ngubane case and Zulu v Zulu 2008 4 SA 12 (D), which involve putative 
marriages by African spouses, the parties had conducted civil, not customary 
marriages. 
53  One issue which could prevent such a development is whether (as it has to be in 
order to qualify as a putative marriage) the marriage ceremony was "performed by a 
marriage officer" as required in the Ngubane case 774 and followed in Solomon v 
Abrams 1991 4 All SA 437 (W), or whether it is sufficient that the marriage was 
"contracted openly and in accordance with the customary rituals and ceremonies" as 
required in the Moola case 281. If the view in the Moola case were adopted, then 
customary marriages which are invalid because they don't comply with customary 
requirements would also not qualify as putative marriages. However, customary 
marriages which are invalid because they co-exist with other civil or customary 
marriages may qualify as putative marriages if they follow customary marriage 
requirements. Space does not permit further analysis of this issue here, but it should 
be explored in more depth.  
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community of property could, however, be problematic. This is discussed 
in the next section. 
3  Universal partnerships and putative marriages for the 
simultaneously married 
The prohibition of bigamy means that, while a valid civil marriage subsists, 
no subsequent marriages or intimate relationships will give rise to legal 
rights. In several of the earlier cases courts classified the second, 
bigamous marriages as putative marriages in order to hold that children 
from those marriages were legitimate.54 Oddly enough, given the 
potentially beneficial financial consequences of a putative marriage for the 
bona fide party, I have been unable to locate any older cases in which 
bona fide putative spouses claimed a share of the partnership property in 
bigamous marriages.55 Cases apply the doctrine of putative marriage only 
to declare children from these marriages legitimate. The only case in 
which financial compensation was claimed was Arendse v Roode56 in 
which the plaintiff wife in a bigamous marriage claimed and was awarded 
damages for seduction and impairment of her dignitas and fama. This 
case was therefore based in delict rather than on a putative marriage or a 
universal partnership.  
V (aka L) v De Wet57 was brought by a woman who had knowingly 
cohabited with a married man for 21 years, during which time they had 
had two children and had jointly operated a painting and decorating 
business. Upon his death she claimed half of his estate. The applicant 
would not have been able to establish a putative marriage because she 
was aware that the deceased had been married. The court applied 
Pothier's requirements58 to rule that a societas quae ex quaestu veniunt 
had existed between the applicant and the deceased. Most interesting, 
however, is the court's failure to apply Pothier's fourth requirement, that 
the contract should be "legitimate" or legal.59 The most obvious objection 
to a partnership contract in these circumstances is that it would be contra 
bonos mores or contrary to public policy, for undermining the institution of 
                                            
54  H (wrongly called C) v C 1929 TPD 992; Potgieter v Bellingan 1940 EDL 264; 
Prinsloo v Prinsloo 1958 3 SA 759 (T); Ngubane case 770. 
55  See the discussion of Zulu v Zulu 2008 4 SA 12 (D) in this paragraph below. 
56  Arendse v Roode 1989 1 SA 763 (C) (hereafter the V case). In the Ramatshibila 
case, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that a delictual claim by a customary wife 
where there was already a subsisting civil marriage was not allowed. 
57  V (aka L) v De Wet 1953 1 SA 612 (O) (hereafter the V case); the Arendse case 
612. 
58  Discussed in para 1 above. 
59  The court in the Butters case para 11 held that this was not unique to partnerships 
but applied equally to all contracts.  
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marriage.60 This case was decided in 1953 when courts would perhaps 
have been more concerned with the protection of the institution of 
marriage than they are now. The omission of this aspect from the 
judgment is therefore particularly significant. Instead, the court held simply 
that if a couple who were married out of community of property could 
establish a societas quae ex quaestu veniunt,61 then "there would seem to 
be no lawful obstacle to a mistress of a man establishing a similar contract 
in a similar manner".62 Equally interesting in this case is the lack of 
information about the matrimonial property system in the marriage. A 
marriage out of community of property would not have presented an 
obstacle to a universal partnership, but if the existing marriage had been in 
community of property, the universal partnership could be problematic. 
In Zulu v Zulu63 the application for a share of a universal partnership was 
brought by a woman who was in a bigamous marriage with a man whose 
existing marriage was in community of property. The matter was argued 
on the basis of a putative marriage (since the applicant did not know of the 
existence of the first marriage) and alternatively on the basis of a universal 
partnership. Dealing first with the putative marriage, the court referred to 
the lack of authority on the patrimonial effects of a putative marriage 
where the pre-existing marriage was in community of property. However, 
on the general principle that the joint estate belongs to both spouses in 
undivided shares and that one spouse could therefore not alienate or 
transfer her or his share of the joint estate, the court held that there was 
no property which could become part of a joint estate in the putative 
(second) marriage. Only those assets which had been excluded from the 
joint estate of the (first) legal marriage could have formed part of a joint 
estate in the putative marriage.64 Smith criticised this reasoning as 
"untenable in that it flies in the face of the entrenched raison d'être of the 
putative marriage by not protecting the bona fide 'spouse''' and suggests 
that the case represented a rare opportunity to develop the common law 
on the proprietary effects of a putative marriage in order to protect the 
financial interests of the bona fide putative spouse.65 
Moving on to the existence of a universal partnership, the court held that 
the pre-existence of a valid marriage would render a subsequent universal 
                                            
60  Maseko v Maseko 1992 3 SA 190 (W); Claassen v Van der Watt 1969 3 SA 68 (T); 
Lloyd v Mitchell 2004 2 All SA 542 (C). 
61  See the cases discussed in para 4 below. 
62  V case 615H-616A. 
63  Zulu case 12. 
64  Zulu case 15B-H. 
65  Smith 2011 SALJ 569, 570. 
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partnership unlawful66 and that, in any event, the requirements for a 
universal partnership had not been proven. The rationale for holding that 
the universal partnership was unlawful was not further explained, but the 
argument that any assets of the bigamous spouse would have fallen into 
the joint estate in the first marriage, raised in relation to the putative 
marriage, would similarly have applied to the universal partnership. 
Even though it deals with the duty to support rather than a right to share in 
partnership property, the case of Paixão is interesting in this respect. The 
deceased man was a spouse in a marriage which had been concluded in 
Portugal in accordance with Portuguese law, when he started to live with 
another woman in South Africa in 2003. His marriage was dissolved in 
June 2007 only six months before he died in a car accident on 2 January 
2008. Considering various factors indicating the marriage-like nature of the 
cohabitation relationship, the court held that the cohabitant had 
established the existence of a tacit agreement to maintain her, which 
existed even while the deceased was still married to his Portuguese wife.67 
Unless the Portuguese marriage was for some reason not fully recognised 
in South Africa (of which the case gives no hint), it would constitute a 
complete legal impediment to a spouse entering into an engagement or 
another marriage68 and would, on the reasoning in Zulu, render the 
agreement to support unlawful. Nevertheless, Cachalia JA appears to 
have minimised the significance of the Portuguese marriage, mentioning 
that the deceased had faced "the obstacle of his having to be 'officially' 
divorced in Portugal"69 and that "he felt constrained not to marry before his 
divorce was also concluded and recognised in Portugal".70 In certain cases 
like V and Paixão, courts appear to be unwilling to engage with the issue 
of legality, which needs to be clarified by future litigation or legislation. 
It is furthermore unclear whether a universal partnership would usually 
include a duty to maintain or whether a separate agreement is needed to 
establish a right to support. In Mc Donald v Young,71 the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, relying on the decision in Volks v Robinson,72 stated unequivocally 
that outside of marriage a duty of support arises as a result of an express 
or tacit agreement only.73 The male cohabitant argued, on the one hand, 
for the existence of a joint venture (which I take to mean a partnership) in 
                                            
66  Paixão case 16A-B. 
67  Paixão case 20. 
68  See the Ngubane and Zulu cases. 
69  Paixão case 21, my emphasis. 
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71  McDonald v Young 2012 3 SA 1 (SCA). 
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relation to a particular piece of land, the purpose of which was said to be 
to provide him with financial independence. Simultaneously he argued that 
the respondent had tacitly undertaken a duty to support him. The court 
held that the two agreements were mutually incompatible in the sense that 
if the parties had concluded a joint venture agreement in order to render 
the appellant financially independent from the respondent, then they would 
not also have had the intention to create a legal duty of support towards 
him.74 But herein lies the rub. The court held that he had failed to prove 
the existence of a joint venture, but that his claim for a tacit maintenance 
agreement was still precluded by the evidence that there was an express 
joint venture agreement. The court cannot have it both ways. Either there 
was a joint venture, which then precluded the existence of an agreement 
to maintain, or, if there was no evidence of a joint venture, then this 
(non)evidence could not be used to negate the existence of an agreement 
to maintain. The evidence that the respondent had in fact supported him 
financially for seven years was also held not to prove the existence of a 
tacit contract to maintain on the argument that where parties perform in 
terms of a non-existent contract, that does not establish a contract, since 
they may erroneously have assumed there to have been a contract.75  
Even though it never states that a partnership cannot coexist with a tacit 
agreement to maintain, the nature of the reasoning in this case could 
impede women's abilities to prove both tacit contracts of support and tacit 
universal partnerships, or alternatively to prove tacit contracts in which 
partners agree both to maintenance and asset sharing. This line of 
argument would be based on the premise that the aim of the universal 
partnership is to render the poorer spouse financially independent. That is 
not necessarily the case. An equally plausible aim of a partnership 
agreement may well be the equitable distribution of the fruits of both 
parties' labours and there is no logical reason to why this should be 
incompatible with a mutual undertaking to support each other financially. 
All of the preceding cases in this paragraph dealt with civil marriages. 
However, the possibility of co-existing customary marriages is probably 
even stronger and the consequences potentially more complicated. Even 
though polygyny is an inherent feature of customary marriages, and it 
could therefore not be argued that universal partnership agreements which 
co-exist with customary marriages are unlawful for undermining the 
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institution of customary marriage, there are other obstacles. In MM v MN76 
the Constitutional Court held that a Tsonga customary marriage concluded 
without the permission of existing customary wife was invalid. The 
judgment specifically declined to formulate a general rule for all customary 
marriages, but, as Himonga and Pope argue, the nature of the court's 
reasoning in this case and its emphasis on gender equality would 
inevitably influence future cases about the issue.77 If this is indeed so, all 
subsequent customary marriages which have been concluded without the 
permission of the existing customary wives could be invalid and wives 
from these marriages left without any rights to partnership property. 
Himonga and Pope point out that, given the reality that customary 
marriages are seldom registered, subsequent customary wives have no 
way of ascertaining whether their husbands are also spouses in other 
customary marriages and that they would need permission from the first 
wives.78 The authors also criticise the judgment for failing to develop 
customary law to protect the rights of subsequent wives.79 Two potential 
avenues for such development are to apply the common law concept of 
putative marriage to the subsequent marriages, or to hold that there were 
universal partnerships between the second wives and their husbands. 
Whether universal partnerships and putative marriages could serve this 
purpose depends in turn upon Gumede v President of the Republic of 
South Africa,80 which held that customary marriages which are not subject 
to antenuptial contracts, including those entered into before the 
commencement of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, are in 
community of property. If the reasoning in Zulu v Zulu is followed, a first 
marriage in community of property would effectively preclude proof of 
universal partnerships or putative marriages in all subsequent customary 
marriages. It would also mean that there can be no universal partnerships 
or putative marriages in cohabitation relationships which co-exist with 
customary marriages in community of property because property which 
already forms part of a joint marital estate cannot form part of a universal 
partnership with another person. 
The same problem exists when customary or Muslim religious marriages 
are concluded after valid civil marriages or civil partnerships in terms of 
the Civil Union Act. In these cases the inherently monogamous nature of 
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78  Himonga and Pope 2013 Acta Juridica 333. 
79  Himonga and Pope 2013 Acta Juridica 338. 
80  Gumede case 152. 
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civil marriage would render the subsequent customary or Muslim religious 
marriages invalid.81 Civil marriages concluded while there are existing 
customary marriages are invalid.82 Where the existing marriages are in 
community of property, the arguments from Zulu would prevent any 
reliance on a putative marriage or universal partnership to obtain property 
rights for the subsequent wives. 
The problems in simultaneous marriages are therefore first, whether 
universal partnerships which co-exist with civil marriages would undermine 
the institution of marriage and would therefore be unlawful and, second, 
whether universal partnerships and putative marriages can co-exist with 
marriages in community of property. Another issue is whether agreements 
to maintain can co-exist with universal partnerships. Neither of these 
questions has been fully canvassed or convincingly justified, especially in 
the light of the constitutional prohibitions of discrimination on the bases of 
marital status and gender. Another issue which has not been the subject 
of litigation yet is whether universal partnerships or putative marriages can 
co-exist with existing marriages to which the accrual system applies.83 
Accrual means that during the marriage the spouses have separate 
estates and the bigamous spouse should therefore be free to dispose of 
these assets, including in a universal partnership with a third party. 
Nevertheless, this could influence the amounts available for sharing by the 
first spouse under the accrual system. 
4  Universal partnerships for the unwisely married: Civil 
marriages out of community of property without 
accrual 
The lack of a general judicial discretion to distribute property equitably 
when spouses have concluded an antenuptial contract which precludes all 
sharing has been a concern ever since the enactment of s 7(3) of the 
Divorce Act, and it has become more pressing as ever-decreasing 
numbers of women qualify for the limited redistributive discretion provided 
in the legislation.84 Despite widespread academic critiques,85 there has 
been no legislative intervention. Litigants have therefore tried to use the 
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universal partnership, particularly the societas quae ex quaestu veniunt 
(partnership relating to a particular business venture) to ameliorate the 
financial inequities of marriages out of community of property by allocating 
some share of (usually) the husbands' assets to their wives upon death or 
divorce.86 Whether or not this is legally permitted remains unclear in the 
light of the contradictory jurisprudence.87 Obviously, the doctrine of 
putative marriage cannot apply to parties who have been married out of 
community of property. This section deals, therefore, only with universal 
partnerships. 
In Fink v Fink88 the court held that there was a tacit universal partnership 
(probably societas quae ex quaestu veniunt) to which both spouses 
contributed money, property and labour in respect of a dairy business run 
mainly by the wife, while the husband was engaged in full-time 
employment. The Supreme Court of Appeal decision in Mühlmann v 
Mühlmann89 confirmed that a universal partnership, probably in the form of 
societas quae ex quaestu veniunt, could exist in a marriage out of 
community of property where the spouses conducted an electro-plating 
business together since the start of their marriage. Neither judgment 
expressly addressed the question of how a universal partnership could 
coexist with an antenuptial contract excluding community of property, 
instead simply proceeding on the basis that this was possible. 
This willingness to hold that universal partnerships existed in marriages 
out of community of property was brought to an abrupt halt by two 
decisions by Milne JA in 1989. In the first, Kritzinger v Kritzinger,90 the 
husband of a wealthy and successful businesswoman argued that he was 
entitled to a redistribution order in terms of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act 
because he had sacrificed opportunities for advancement in his own 
profession to ensure the success of his wife's career. He also argued, and 
the trial court agreed, that his contributions to the common home proved 
the existence of a universal partnership, in which he had a 50% share. In 
the Appellate Division, however, Milne JA emphasised that apart from both 
contributing to the common home, the spouses both had careers, separate 
bank accounts and essentially separate financial lives. He held that the 
sharing of domestic expenses did not in itself constitute a legal partnership 
and that in this case there was no evidence "of the home being regarded 
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as a joint business run for a profit".91 This therefore distinguishes the 
earlier decisions in Isaacs, Ratanee and Ally v Dinath, in which the 
maintenance of the joint household and the education of the children were 
regarded as indicators of a universal partnership.92 
In the same year Milne JA also handed down judgment in Katz v Katz,93 in 
which a very wealthy wife relied on a letter written to her by her husband 
eight years before the case was brought, shortly after she had discovered 
that he had been committing adultery. In the letter the husband stated that 
"I have always considered our marriage a universal partnership and I 
should imagine that is how you have seen it".94 Unlike the trial court, which 
regarded this as proof of a universal partnership, Milne JA pointed to the 
circumstances in which this letter had been written, and the fact that the 
wife had now committed adultery, to hold that the terms of the letter were 
not legally considered to be a universal partnership, even though the 
husband had been an attorney and should, presumably, have understood 
the legal nature and consequences of the term.95 The division of property 
could therefore not be based on a universal partnership between the 
spouses. The effect of these two Appellate Division judgments was to halt 
the stream of jurisprudence which was becoming ever more sympathetic 
to finding universal partnerships in marriages out of community of 
property. Both of these cases related to the societas universorum 
bonorum and they could therefore be read as not extending to the 
possibility of the societas quae ex quaestu veniunt in a marriage out of 
community of property.  
The next case on this issue, JW v CW,96 was handed down twenty years 
later in September 2010, therefore preceding by two years the Supreme 
Court of Appeal's most recent developments relating to universal 
partnerships. A farmer's wife claimed that a universal partnership relating 
to the husband's farming enterprise was concluded immediately after the 
marriage, and that she had made substantial contributions to the 
partnership. In order to distinguish this case from Mühlmann, Olivier J held 
that the claim was for societas universorum bonorum, rather than societas 
quae ex quaestu veniunt,97 but the basis for this distinction is nowhere 
explained in the judgment. The situation was also distinguished from that 
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in Fink by holding that in Fink the universal partnership was entered into 
two years after the marriage and excluded the husband's immoveable 
property, while in this case it was alleged to have included the farm and to 
have been entered into straight after the marriage, in other words, very 
soon after the conclusion of the antenuptial contract. Given that in 
Mühlmann the Appelate Division found that a partnership quae ex quaestu 
veniunt was concluded immediately after the wedding, the distinction 
between a partnership concluded immediately after the marriage and one 
concluded two years later could be said to be somewhat arbitrary. A 
further reason was that the terms of the antenuptial contract precluded a 
reliance on a universal partnership, specifically clause 4, in which "it was 
agreed to act in the spirit of the antenuptial contract when it came to, inter 
alia, the property of the parties".98 The judgment does not contain any 
further detail of the contents of this clause. It could be argued that acting in 
the "spirit of the contract" is nothing more than the behaviour normally 
expected of contracting parties and that this clause should not make any 
material difference to the outcome of the case. 
Nevertheless, the main basis for the court's decision must be taken 
seriously, especially as it had not been raised in previous cases. The court 
held that, given the fact that a societas universorum bonorum would 
effectively change the marriage from being out of community of property 
without accrual to a marriage in community of property,99 this informal 
method of variation of the antenuptial contract could not be allowed. It held 
that the only method for changing the antenuptial contract would be 
through a joint application to a court.100 If this reasoning is correct, then 
the consequence must be that no tacit universal partnerships universorum 
bonorum can exist in marriages subject to antenuptial contracts. It does, 
however, leave the door open for universal partnerships quae ex quaestu 
veniunt. Moreover, it could also be argued that section 21 of the 
Matrimonial Property Act should be generously interpreted to allow courts 
to give effect to universal contracts at the end of marriages out of 
community of property. 
In EA v EC101 the same arguments were raised where a wife relied on a 
universal partnership which had been concluded either before or 
simultaneously with an antenuptial contract excluding community of 
property and the accrual system. The wife alleged that the parties agreed 
that the antenuptial contract would operate only as against third parties, 
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but that between them the spouses would have a societas universorum 
bonorum. Following JW, the court held that a partnership universorum 
bonorum would directly contradict the terms of the antenuptial contract 
and was therefore not permitted without a formal amendment of the 
antenuptial contract.102 Moreover evidence of such an agreement would 
be excluded by the parol evidence rule which determines that when 
parties had reduced their agreement to writing, evidence of verbal 
agreements which contradict the document is inadmissible.103  
The facts of SB v RB104 illustrate clearly the iniquity of the current legal 
situation. Although the parties were married out of community of property, 
they agreed to alter their matrimonial property system to a marriage in 
community of property, as reflected in a letter by the husband to the wife. 
However, they were wrongly advised by their lawyer that this could not be 
achieved without divorcing and re-marrying. When the marriage ended, 
the wife relied on their agreement to the effect that the marriage would be 
in community of property, alternatively that there was a universal 
partnership quae ex quaestu veniunt between them. Her first cause of 
action failed because of the principle of immutability whereby parties can 
change their matrimonial property system only by using the existing 
statutory mechanisms.105 Despite criticising the effect of this principle as 
constituting discrimination on the basis of marital status, the court held that 
it had no choice but to apply it to deny the wife's claim.106 The claim for a 
universal partnership also failed because it was incompatible with the 
evidence that the parties had agreed to be married in community of 
property.107 
The latest reported case was RD v TD,108 decided in the Gauteng North 
division. The court distinguished the case from JW v CW by holding that 
the JW case applied only to societas universorum bonorum, while the fish 
farming business started by the spouses in RD three years after the 
marriage constituted a societas quae ex quaestu veniunt, as in Mühlmann 
and Fink. The court held that in this case there was nothing in the 
antenuptial contract which prevented the parties from concluding a bona 
fide partnership contract for the purpose of a joint commercial venture.109 
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A survey of the case law thus reveals the need for an authoritative 
determination of the possibility of a societas universorumbonorum in civil 
marriages out of community of property and the exact nature of the terms 
in antenuptial contracts which would preclude a reliance on such 
partnership contracts. There is authority to the effect that universal 
partnerships universorum bonorum are precluded in marriages out of 
community of property, but that partnerships quae ex quaestu veniunt 
would be possible. The issue of the constitutional tenability of this 
situation, which was raised in SB v RB,110 has not been resolved. 
Ultimately, however, as Smith points out, the universal partnership 
contract is not the best way to resolve inequities which arise at the end of 
marriages which exclude the sharing of partnership property, because it 
has to be done on a case-by-case basis.111 Until the incorporation of a 
general judicial discretion to redistribute assets, it is nevertheless the most 
promising vehicle, at least for those parties who can afford the costs of 
legal representation and possibly litigation. 
5  Conclusion 
In EA v EC112 Kathree-Setiloane J remarked that: 
One sincerely hopes that women have transcended the belief in the 
unrealistic and naïve notion that they will marry, have children and be 
supported for the rest of their lives by their husbands. The vast majority of 
women, today, do not fit this mould. Most women, today, are strong, 
intelligent, educated and independent. They share equally in the support of 
their homes and families – and will stand for nothing but equality in their 
marriages – regardless of their socio-economic circumstances. To the 
extent, however, that some women may not be fully apprised of their rights – 
surely the solution does not lie with interfering with the parole evidence rule, 
but rather with introducing programmes to educate and empower women to 
transcend any discrimination which they may still face on marriage, or upon 
divorce 
Given the fact that in the cases which I surveyed all the claimants bar two 
were women, it is difficult to dispute the gendered dimension of claims for 
universal partnerships and putative marriages, which in turn point to the 
detrimental consequences of the current legal rules for the division of 
property for women. Although these rules are couched in gender-neutral 
terms and treat men and women alike, they operate in social, cultural and 
religious contexts which are anything but egalitarian. 
Non-legal norms and rules determine that women are the ones who do the 
unpaid, caring work, and who give up or curtail their careers in favour of 
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partners and children. A conspicuous feature of the cases is the way in 
which social norms dictate that women must "assist" in their partners' 
economic ventures, but that their contributions are disparaged and 
undervalued when relationships end. Social norms are translated into 
lower pay for what is regarded as "typically women's work" like cleaning 
and caring, and women get paid less even when they do the same work 
as men. Social norms within families dictate that women's earnings are 
often used to cover day-to-day expenses, while men's earnings are 
invested in shares and immoveable property which appreciate in value. 
"Common sense" and "convenience" dictate that immoveable property is 
registered in men's names only, with the result that most often women are 
the ones left penniless at the end of their relationships. 
These women are not ignorant of their rights, nor are they necessarily 
uneducated or foolish. They are simply behaving according to the 
gendered scripts required of them by their families, their communities, 
their churches, and all of their cultures. To suggest otherwise is naïve. 
Proposing educational programmes as a panacea in the face of a 
patriarchal family law system and extra-legal norms is unrealistic. The 
current family law system is deeply embedded in patriarchy, and the 
strong chances that the validity of customary marriages will be 
successfully challenged and the failure thus far to extend common law 
remedies like universal partnerships and putative marriages to women 
whose customary marriages are invalid means that family law 
systematically fails African women, especially those who are poor and live 
in rural areas. Common law therefore urgently needs to develop to afford 
all women equal rights to partnership property, and I hope that I have 
illustrated some possible avenues in this article.  
Particularly beneficial could be a sustained development of the rules 
relating to putative marriages, insofar as they regulate the division of 
property. Since the concept and consequences of illegitimacy have been 
done away with, fewer cases rely on putative marriages, and the archaic 
rules relating to the distribution of property are particularly 
underdeveloped. Wives in customary marriages who find, at divorce or 
upon the death of their spouses, that their marriages were never valid 
because of a failure to comply with a customary formality are in dire need 
of legal relief. The putative marriage offers an avenue for achieving this. It 
may also assist wives in simultaneous civil and customary marriages, but 
the courts will have to craft egalitarian measures where there is an existing 
marriage in community of property. The irony of the present situation, 
where only one wife is recognised and is awarded rights to property, is 
E BONTHUYS  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  23 
that the man, who is often the only person who is aware of the 
simultaneous marriages, has guaranteed rights to partnership property. A 
three-way distribution of property is conceivable, as is the idea of reducing 
or even eliminating the "guilty" party's property entitlement.  
The other avenue to award rights to partnership property is an extension 
of the existing rules relating to universal partnerships. They have been 
particularly useful to ameliorate the effects of the absolute separation of 
property in civil marriages which don't qualify for redistribution in terms of 
the Divorce Act, but there are important issues which need to be clarified. 
The first is whether a societas universorum bonorum is available in a 
marriage out of community of property and under which conditions a 
societas quae ex quaestu veniunt would be possible. Another question 
relates to the simultaneous existence of a universal partnership and an 
agreement to maintain outside of marriage. The legality of a universal 
partnership contract which co-exists with a valid legal marriage is another 
outstanding issue, as are the evidential requirements to prove such an 
agreement.  
Although I have not included this in the current discussion, Rule has 
pointed out the need to investigate the extent to which laws relating to 
partnerships apply during the existence of universal partnerships in 
intimate relationships. Could, for instance, parties insist on uberimae fidei 
and accounts from one another during the relationship? Could both be 
held liable for debts?113 None of the cases applying universal partnerships 
have considered these issues and they are unlikely to arise while these 
relationships remain functional. Another unconsidered issue is the 
calculation of the shares in universal partnerships at the end of 
relationships, which seems to be limited to the net surplus value but not 
the debts. This appears to be akin to the calculation of the accrual during 
marriage, rather than partnership.  
Although I advocate developments to both universal partnerships and 
putative marriages, it is important that courts keep the requirements and 
consequences of these two common law legal forms separate, instead of 
simply using universal partnerships to distribute property in putative 
marriages as was done in earlier cases. The reason is that putative 
marriages may provide legal relief where universal partnerships are not 
technically applicable and vice versa. Ultimately, however, the time is ripe 
for an extensive overhaul of our matrimonial property system, including the 
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rights of unmarried partners, which have fallen by the wayside along with 
the second part of the Draft Bill on Domestic Partnerships.  
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